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1 Disability in a society of equals
My task in this paper is to ask what we need to do if we are to construct a society in which 
people are to be treated as equals, whatever their disability status. Many of my conclusions 
will not be news to people who are active in the disability movement. However I intend to 
provide a conceptual framework for posing and attempting to settle this question, and to 
help clarify some policy objectives. Furthermore analytical political philosophy seems to 
have lagged behind social policy on these issues, and the treatment of disability by 
analytical philosophers has often seemed weak. I hope, here, to take some steps to correct 
this.
Three related questions will be central to this paper. First, what is it to have a 
disability? Second, in what way or ways are people with disabilities typically 
disadvantaged; and finally what should be done to rectify this disadvantage?
Before going any further it is worth considering some issues of basic terminology, 
both for its own sake, and for the introduction it gives is to the philosophical issues. Once it 
was acceptable, and, indeed, normal practice to use such terms as ‘cripple’ or ‘spastic’, 
although these now seem less current, and have been replaced, to some degree, with more 
euphemistic terms such as ‘handicapped’ or ‘impaired’. Yet both of these terms have been 
found objectionable, for different reasons. Although the idea of a handicap has entered 
general discourse in many contexts, such as horse racing,  Shelley Tremain points out that, 
according to the Oxford English Dictionary, it derives from the phrase ‘cap-in-hand’ i.e. the 
pose of someone begging for hand outs. The handicapped went cap-in-hand to the more 
2fortunate, for charity, so it is said.1 Whether or not this is accurate, the term is beginning to 
fall into disfavour with disability activists.
‘Impaired’ is problematic for a different - - more obvious - - reason. It is a normative 
term, implying the failure to reach a standard of normal functioning. Thus this 
conceptualises disability as a physical or mental shortfall or lack of some sort; in essence it 
apparently pre-supposes what is called the ‘medical model’ of disability, in which 
disability is conceived of primarily as akin to a form of illness. No doubt for many people
this is an intuitive way of understanding disability, but it assumes a picture of disability 
that can be challenged. Again many disability activists refrain from using this term for 
these reasons. Those relatively new to the issue may think this is an example of ‘political 
correctness gone mad’, but I hope to show that to think this way would be a mistake.
What terminology, then, should we use? Anita Silvers suggests that practice differs 
in the UK and the US.2 In the UK the accepted term is ‘person with a disability’. The idea 
behind this is obvious; that one should see the person first, and the disability as a 
contingent property of the person, rather than the defining feature of that person. People 
with disabilities are, first and foremost, people. In the US, however, the preferred term is 
‘disabled person’. This is said to bring out the idea that people are disabled by the societies 
they live in. To explain, although it is a natural fact that individuals have certain physical 
and mental features, how these features enable them to function depends upon how 
society is configured in various ways. Thus, on this view - - the social model of disability - -
disablement is something society does to people. Hence this usage captures the thought 
that it is important to remind ourselves that there is a sense in which the disabled are 
3victims of society; they are disabled people. (In this paper I shall use both terms: ‘disabled 
person’ and ‘person with disability’ more or less inter-changeably.)
Implicit, then, in these terminological choices are particular models or 
understandings of disability. The medical model sees disability as impairment, a lack of 
functioning. Thus the medical model answers our first question - - what is it to have a 
disability? - - by assimilating disability to a form of severe illness, to be attended to by 
medical professionals. The disadvantage of disability (our second question) is, on such a 
view, the disadvantage of impaired functioning. The proper remedy (our third question) is 
medical treatment to restore as much functioning as possible.
The social model, which has come to dominate much recent thinking, rejects this 
approach, refusing to identify disability with a biological notion of impairment, 
emphasising the social contingency of disability. For consider; there are times and places 
where the colour of one’s skin can impede ‘normal’ functioning. Yet it would be absurd to 
think that the remedy for this is in the hands of the medical profession. Social change, not 
surgery, is required. It is an open question how far similar reasoning applies to issues of 
standard cases of disability. Certainly some physical features can be an impairment in one 
social context but not another.
Indeed in assessment of the view that disability is entirely ‘socially constructed’ we 
might even ask: could something even be an impairment in some contexts but an 
advantage in others? Sometimes it is said that in certain primitive societies those with 
unusual body shapes were treated as gods and goddesses.3 But we do not need to look so 
far for examples. Take Manute Bol, a 7ft 7in Sudanese man who became a successful 
4professional basketball player in the US in the 1980’s. Although by no means a top-level 
natural athlete his extreme height gave him a huge advantage, making him one of the great 
'blockers' of recent times. If the game of basketball did not exist his height may have been 
considered an impairment: certainly it makes many occupations and leisure pursuits 
unavailable. (Of course the right thing to say might be that it is both an advantage in some 
respects and a disadvantage in others.) But it would be dogmatic merely to assume that all 
disability is of such radically socially contingent nature.
The medical and social models of disability do not exhaust the field, but rather than 
conduct a survey I want to set out in schematic form a type of naive social theory that will 
help illuminate the issues raised so far, and to take us further. For the sake of the 
illustration suppose we have settled on a particular understanding of what it is for an 
individual life to go well or badly, insofar as this should be a matter of political concern. (I 
will, of course, discuss this in more detail below). Call this the individual good. Consider 
now a given individual. What will determine the opportunities that this person has to live 
an individual good life? Crudely there are two sorts of factors we need to enter into the 
calculations: what the person has; and what they can do with it. 
The first of these categories we can call ‘resources’; this includes both external 
resources - - money, control over parts of the external world etc - - and ‘internal resources’ 
- - Rawlsian natural assets. However, you cannot ‘read of’ from an individual’s resources 
their chances of leading a good life. You also need to know facts about the social structures 
within that society; the influence of tradition, religion, language, culture and other social 
norms (such as what counts, within that society, as an acceptably ‘normal life’); the 
5configuration of the material and natural environment, and perhaps other things too. 
Slightly misleadingly I shall refer to all of this as ‘social structure’. Thus the overall formula 
comes to this: the interaction of your resources with the social structure within which you 
find yourself determines your opportunities to live a good life. A crude example: in some 
agricultural societies a man is more likely to have opportunities to live a good life if he is 
physically very strong; in technically advanced societies physical strength becomes of more 
marginal significance. If social structures determine the contours of a normal life, your 
resources and other aspects of the social structure will determine your chances of being 
able to live such a life.4
Against this framework we can see that the medical model of disability suggests 
that people with disabilities have a less extensive set of ‘internal resources’ than others, 
and recommend that we act to boost this set. By contrast the social model prefers to say 
that social structures discriminate against people with a certain resource-bundle and thus 
we need to change social structures to eliminate this discrimination. What do leading 
contemporary political philosophers say? Rather little, unfortunately.
Notoriously John Rawls declines to discuss what he calls ‘the problem of handicaps’ 
in A Theory of Justice side-stepping the issue by assuming a simplified model of the social 
world in which, among other things, no one suffers from disabilities. The justification 
offered for this is the suggestion that it is important to get the central cases right before 
dealing with special cases which may be distracting.5  However Rawls has not returned to 
the issues at any length.
6Ronald Dworkin has considered the issues in greater detail. For Dworkin the 
disabled are conceptualised in medical terms as lacking a resource. His solution is that they 
should be given another resource - - money - - to compensate for this loss, and spends 
considerable time and ingenuity attempting to work out the right level of compensation.
Dworkin is typical of a number of especially egalitarian political philosophers who 
see compensation as the correct response to injustice. We could call this the ‘compensation 
paradigm’: where an injustice is to be rectified, let us use money. Yet, particularly in the 
case of disability, we seem to have reason to be suspicious. First, as far as I know it is very 
rare for disability activists to make this suggestion, or for it to form part of social policy. 
Second, we know there are alternatives (and they will be explored in detail later in this 
paper). Third, as I shall hope to show, it relies on implausible assumptions about the 
individual good.
The ‘Ill’ of Disability and the Individual Good
We have already noted that both the medical and social models of disability are likely to 
include answers to all three of our questions: what is disability?; what is the disadvantage 
of disability? and what should be done?6 As we add variations among these models, and 
new understandings such as the phenomenological model,7 we will have a new range of 
answers to these questions.
The new problem we then face, though, is that we have too many answers to our 
questions. There is no reason to think that the competing models of disability will converge 
7on a single scheme of redress for disability: indeed there is every reason to believe 
otherwise. How, then, can we make progress?
One route ahead would be to try to determine which model of disability captures its 
real essence. Once this is settled everything else should fall into place. Yet each model of 
disability seems to capture some element of importance. Would it be possible to provide a 
synthetic approach, combining the insights of all models? Perhaps, but the question would 
then be what to leave out, and unguided by a further principle or methodology any 
decision may look arbitrary. This then points to the idea that we should see if there is 
anything the diverse models have in common at a more abstract level. If so this may at 
least provide a guide for working out how to build the more complex model.
My conjecture is that there is a single insight - - albeit very vague - - driving all 
theorists of disability. In a discussion of the phenomenological model of disability, Gareth 
Williams notes that, on such an analysis people with disabilities need to ‘renogiatate their 
place in the world’, or in an alternative phrase ‘re-establish their place in the world’.8
Although Williams suggests that this is a contrast to the approach taken on the medical 
model, where the emphasis is to ‘do things to the impaired body’, it seems to me that 
defenders of the medical model may rightly protest. After all, they will say, the reason why 
we want to do things to impaired bodies is to allow people with impaired bodies to re-
establish their place in the world. The disagreement is not on this general goal, but how to 
formulate the goal in proper detail and then how to achieve it. Thus I will take Williams’ 
phrase as a statement that unifies all approaches: justice to those with disabilities requires 
8society to find ways for those people to establish (or re-establish) a worthwhile place in the 
world.
At this point we can see that just as each model of disability points to its own 
solution, it must, at the same time, make certain underlying assumptions, whether 
explicitly or implicitly. That is, in order to talk of establishing a place in the world, we need 
to know what it is to have a place in the world. Is it to earn a living? To enjoy a good level 
of well-being? To live independently? To have a real say in political decision-making? To 
contribute to the lives of others? To form close relationships and have children? To have a 
narrative unity to one’s life? Or all of these or none of them? At the very least, with the
idea of establishing a place in the world in mind we can see why notions such as 'enabling' 
and 'inclusion' have become so central to discussions of disability.
Putting this thought together with the naive social theory of the last section, we now 
have the following: one’s resources and the social structure in which one finds oneself 
jointly determine one’s opportunities to find a (worthwhile) place in the world. This three 
part (resources/social structure/place in the world) analysis is central to what follows in 
this paper.
Remedy, Compensation, Nullification
If our task is to consider what is owed to people with disabilities it seems vital to have on 
hand an account of the possibilities. That is, if we think redress of some sort is owed,9 it 
would be helpful to have an account of forms of redress. That is the task of this section.
9It seems that redress for any injustice or other wrong can take a number of forms. 
While it would be wrong to pretend that terminology is entirely stable in this area we can, I 
believe, distinguish three broad families of redress or rectification, which I shall call 
'remedy', 'compensation' and 'nullification'.
a) Remedy.
By remedy I mean something like restitution or strict rectification. If someone illegitimately 
takes an item of my property one form of redress would be to have it returned 
immediately. Thus the situation is restored to exactly the same as it would have been as if 
no injustice had taken place. If you knock down my wall, you can restore the situation by 
building it up again.10 In the context of thinking about disability, remedy means complete 
cure. It operates in the space of resources. A disabled person has a diminished resource 
bundle, and a cure restores that resource bundle to the proper level.
On the face of it, if remedy is an available option in respect of any injustice or other 
wrong it should be the first thing we should consider when attempting to find a form of 
redress. Does this mean that medical cure must always the preferred option for redressing 
disability? Not necessarily. Even if it should be the first thing to consider, this does not 
mean that it must always be chosen. Why not? One reason is that if someone has  evolved a 
pattern of life in which their disability is a central feature of their identity, then a medical 
cure may involve too severe a disruption to contemplate. Another, more mundane, 
consideration is that medical intervention has its own costs - - treatment may be lengthy, 
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painful, disruptive and arduous - - and this may tip the balance in seeking out some 
alternative.11 Third, ‘complete cure’ must be very rare. Traces or more of disability will 
often remain, and thus full remedy, even in purely medical terms, is generally not on offer. 
In the terminology I shall adopt here, medical intervention is likely to be mitigating rather 
than to offer complete redress. Fourthly, whether or not complete remedy is available, 
medical intervention may be very costly in terms of its use of resources and this, at least in 
some cases, must be a relevant factor. I will return to this towards the end of this paper. 
A somewhat deeper point is that to be fixated on the idea of cure assumes that the 
biological aspect of disability must be an impairment, which then must be capable of cure. 
In other words, as stated above, to concentrate on a cure is to concentrate on altering an 
individual’s resource-bundle. This is to overlook the fact that one’s life prospects are 
determined both by resource and social structures, and thus to ignore the possibility that,
at least in some cases, alterations to social structures may be more appropriate.
However, abstracting from all these considerations there is an important further 
consideration, connected to ideas of respect, pity and humiliation, which I shall emphasise 
later, and which sometimes tells against a policy of remedy for disability. In conclusion 
while, where available, remedy is obviously an attractive option for redress of disability, 
there is also be another side to the story.
b) Compensation. 
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The term ‘compensation’ is used in a variety of ways. Normally the issue of compensation 
is only relevant in the face of some sort of deficit or disadvantage. Thus the Chief Executive 
does not receive a wage for his extreme efforts, but a ‘compensation package’, and then 
gets further compensation when fired for incompetence. You can compensate for an 
unbalanced bicycle by leaning over the other side. I can compensate you for the 
inconvenience I have caused you by giving you a cash payment. In general I understand 
the idea of full compensation as providing goods in one category to make up completely 
for the lack or loss of goods; generally, if not always, in another category.  Compensation is 
thus to be distinguished from consolation, where a token of some sort is given to take away 
the immediate pinch of disappointment. Nozick defines compensation thus: ‘Something 
fully compensates a person for a loss if and only if it makes him no worse off than he 
otherwise would have been ... In the terminology of economists something compensates X 
for Y ... if receiving it leaves him on least as high an indifference curve as he would have 
been without receiving it [had Y not been the case].’12
Nozick’s reference to indifference curves provides one interpretation of what it is to 
be no worse off: a matter of equal preference satisfaction. On this understanding of well-
being full compensation for a loss makes you neither pleased nor sorry that you have 
suffered that loss when it is packaged with the compensating payment. We should note, 
however, that in the real world compensation is often only partial - - it mitigates but it 
doesn’t redress.
Can disability ever be fully compensated for? If our project is to compensate people 
for disabilities with money, then we have a radical project indeed. How much money 
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would you have to give a disabled person so that he or she becomes indifferent between on 
the one hand having the disability and the money, and on the other having neither the 
disability or the money? Obviously it depends on the person and on the disability, but 
even if we restrict ourselves to mitigating compensation a massive programme of transfers 
is in prospect.13 This does not, of course, show that compensation is the wrong approach to 
redress for disability, but it should make us wary about what might be achievable this way.
But need compensation be financial and need well-being be a matter of preference 
satisfaction? Taking the latter issue first, there are many theories where well-being is not 
identified with preference satisfaction.14 For example, the leading idea here of ‘having a 
place in the world’ is not obviously translatable into preference satisfaction terms. 
However if well-being is not a matter of preference satisfaction then the indifference curve 
test is an inadequate criteria of whether a measure fully compensates: to restore someone 
to their previous level of well-being is not necessarily the same thing as to restore them to 
their previous level of preference satisfaction. What would be a test? We cannot say any 
more on this score without a concrete proposal for an account of well-being. However, as 
compensation is generally thought of in preference satisfaction terms, I shall follow that 
usage in the remainder of this paper.
This leaves us with the question of whether compensation must always be financial. 
Of course it need not be, all sorts of things can make up for the lack of something else, but 
on my account to be compensation rather than remedy it will generally be a payment in a 
different kind of good than the one lost or missing. On my understanding compensation-
proper is, we can say, cross-category, provided we draw the categories finely enough.15 But 
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we can conclude that compensation, like remedy, also operates in the pace of resources. Its 
response to a diminished resource bundle is to offer more resources, of a different type, to 
make up for the lack.
c) Nullification
Sometimes a disability can disappear without medical intervention. How so? By the world 
changing so that a formerly disabling characteristic is no longer so. This much we have 
learnt from the social model of disability. So, for example, if we are prepared to accept that 
being female can, in certain times and places, be a disability, then the point is easily made: 
liberation does not require surgical operation. A less controversial example: some years 
ago the standard colour-coding of domestic electric wires in the UK was changed. This 
was, I am told, so that those with common forms of colour-blindness could change their 
own plugs. A minor partial, or mitigating, nullification of disability.
Many suggestions along the lines of ‘enabling’ those with disabilities or for 
‘inclusion’ are suggestions for mitigating nullification.16 The idea is that although an 
individual has a particular biological characteristic, we should do our best to ensure that 
such a characteristic does not exclude that individual from society. What do we do? So far 
we have not been very imaginative, but wheelchairs, access ramps, voice-activated 
software and so on are steps in this direction. More sensitive education and public 
awareness campaigns, including awareness and reform of linguistic practice, are also more 
steps we are taking clumsily. Even if nullification is rarely, if ever, total, we can mitigate 
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disability by partially nullifying the effects of impairment by social, political cultural and 
material action - - by changing social structures. 
There are, no doubt, fuzzy boundaries between these concepts. Could one argue 
that wheelchairs and access ramps are (partial) remedy or compensation for disability, 
rather than attempted nullification?17 Ordinary language would probably allow this, but 
we can make some principled distinctions. Remedy tries to restore ‘missing’ resources; 
compensation substitutes different resources, while nullification does not touch resources 
but changes social structures.18 Which of these measures is the most appropriate form of 
redress?
Dworkin’s Approach
As is well-known, Ronald Dworkin’s suggestion for giving disabled people what is owed 
to them is developed from his theory of equality of resources. This is not the place to give a 
full summary of Dworkin’s position, or of the criticisms to which it has been subjected,19
but to bring out first, the main themes of the general approach, second, what I consider to 
be its main disadvantage (and the disadvantages of some distinct and rival approaches), 
and third, why I think it still, nevertheless, provides a vitally important insight into how to 
take the discussion further.
For Dworkin, then, justice requires equality of resources, where this is to be 
understood as requiring an individual’s share of resources to be ‘endowment insensitive 
and ambition sensitive’. This means that inequalities of outcome are permitted where they 
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reflect the freely made choices of individuals, but not where they reflect the hand an 
individual is dealt by fate: bad brute luck. On this view certain categories of people - -
especially those of low talent and the distinct but partially overlapping category of those 
with disabilities - - are theorized as lacking an internal resource. These people of low 
internal resources are to be given extra external resources to compensate for the loss. Given 
what I have said about compensation being only one form of redress we might wonder if a 
move in need of justification has already been made at this point, but let this pass, for the 
moment.
Now it is all very well to say that those who lack internal resources should receive 
extra external resources by way of compensation, but we need to know how much they 
should receive. Understanding the idea of compensation as specified above we would have 
to put each disabled person in a position where he or she no longer minded being disabled 
given the extra other resources they enjoy. Dworkin’s does not find this an acceptable 
approach. 20
Rather than compensation so understood Dworkin instead supposes that we 
proceed by way of a hypothetical insurance market. Imagine, behind a veil of ignorance, 
you don’t know whether you have or will acquire a given impairment, although you know 
its various effects and its statistical probability of affecting you. Imagine next you can  take 
out an insurance policy which will pay out only if you have that particular disability. And 
it will, of course, pay out as a  maximum the sum you have insured against. Naturally the 
cost of the insurance will depend on the probability of a payout and the level of cover 
insured against. Now in making decisions about rational insurance we need to strike a 
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balance. On the one hand we might be tempted to be very conservative and take out a 
huge amount of insurance. But on the other hand, if we end up making no claims under all 
the insurance policies we have then, although fortunate in one important respect, we might 
struggle to pay the premiums. So the balance must be struck so as to try to ensure that 
whether disabled or not our lives are not severely under-resourced. But just as we take 
insurance decisions in real life, we ought to be able to take this hypothetical insurance 
decision to determine the appropriate level of compensation for disability. Moving from 
theoretical device to policy,  we should tax people as if they have taken out insurance 
policies against all forms of disability and provide cash benefits for people with disabilities 
at the level at which they would have insured.21
On the face of it, this proposal fits neatly into the ‘naive social theory’ framework set 
out above. A disabled person finds that, in the given social circumstances, their particular 
resource bundle allows them a lower chance of living a good life than they ought to have. 
Thus they are given another resource - - cash - - to make up for that loss.22
There are, however, various problems and complications. First, we know that there 
are at least three possible approaches to rectify the disadvantage of disability: remedy (i.e. 
cure), nullification and compensation. Why pick one rather than another? G.A. Cohen, in 
one remark, suggests that cost should be the deciding factor in deciding to offer therapy or 
compensation.23 But this seems counter-intuitive. Why?
Schematically I suggest the problem is this: approaches which take financial 
compensation seriously pre-suppose that the good life can be characterised independently 
of the means by which it is achieved. To illustrate, suppose the good life was defined 
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purely in terms of preference satisfaction. Within any given social structure it may be the 
case that numerous different resource bundles would provide an individual with a given 
level of preference satisfaction. In that case one has reason to be indifferent between the 
various resource bundles, in which case it is efficient to decide between them on grounds 
of cost. Similarly it may be the case that for a given resource bundle many different social 
structures would yield the same level of preference satisfaction. Here the individual should 
be indifferent between these social structures, and it makes sense to make a choice on the 
conservative ground of favouring the status quo. Hence proposals that accept the 
compensation paradigm appear to pre-suppose the independence of the good life.
The position is very different, however, if we assume that the good life is not 
independent. What I mean is that it may be the case that either the type of resources at 
one’s disposal, or the place one finds oneself within social structures, are partly 
constitutive of the good life. If, for example, one thinks that the life of a slave, however 
happy, cannot be a good life, then one thinks that one’s place in social structures is partly 
constitutive of a good life. No amount of extra money, or other resources, will help.
I do not pretend to have fully analysed the account of the good life in play here; the 
idea of a worthwhile place in the world. However we can surely accept that it is not 
independent of social structures for as long as it makes use of the idea of inclusion. 
Whether it is independent of resources is a further question. But we can now see what it 
wrong with Cohen’s comment. We should not decide the issue of ‘cure’ versus 
‘compensation’ in cash terms. Rather it should be in terms of what will best restore the 
individual to a worthwhile place in the world. Cure looks more promising. And we can 
18
reply to Dworkin in similar terms. Compensation is generally a poor way of restoring (or 
creating) a worthwhile place in the world. The individualism of Dworkin’s insurance 
market screens off the option of nullification. But even if remedy can be achieved by 
private medicine,24 nullification must, in almost all cases, be a collective or social matter, 
requiring change to the social, political, cultural and material fabric of society. 
The Problem of Perfectionism
Here, though, a different type of sceptic may start to worry about the perfectionist thread 
in the argument so far. In effect my criticism of Dworkin is that people with disabilities 
ought to be given the opportunity to be included in society, but the provision of 
compensation alone may not meet this goal very well. But here it might be asked why that
is the goal? Surely the last thing people with disabilities need is a condescending political 
philosopher telling them what they ought to want. If we give individuals with disabilities 
money they can at least do what they want with it, rather than having it spent on their 
behalf. After all, one thing that people with disabilities might do is spend their money on 
projects to make the environment more inclusive, or on a medical cure. So it should be 
their choice, and if they choose not to spend money that way, so be it.
Dworkin himself raises this type of point with an example. Imagine that we believe 
that a paraplegic man should be provided with expensive equipment to improve his 
mobility. Thank you very much, he says, but I am a violinist and if you are going to spend 
money on me I would much rather you bought me a new violin.25 Here we may be pulled 
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in two directions. On the one hand, if a person suffers from a lack of mobility then it may 
seem that what he is entitled to is the means to mobility and nothing else. On this view,
then, there is no case for giving this man a violin. On the other hand, if it costs us no more, 
it is what he wants and improves his life, how dare we refuse?
There is a lot to be said about this example, but rather than attempt to say it all let 
me say instead that the example may be somewhat misleading. One thing to bear in mind 
is that wheelchairs are not really all that good, although, of course, normally better than 
nothing. A wheelchair is mitigating at best; it can never provide an equivalent to full 
functioning, and will sometimes even stigmatize its user in the eyes of certain others. So 
consider another example. Suppose we can offer, instead, an operation that would totally 
restore functioning and leave no trace of any sort. This can be known in advance to be a 
full remedy, quick and painless, and a complete cure. No thanks, says the violinist, just 
give me the cost of the operation and let me spend it however I want. I think that the 
objection that it would be perfectionist to refuse to hand over the cash seems in this case to 
have little, if any, force. This is not to say that we would never, in the end, decide that the 
money is better spent that way, but rather that we do not think we should be held captive 
to the individual’s expressed preferences.
How can we explain this? Our starting point - - and this may only be to repeat the 
point rather than explain it - -  is that the claim we feel is to help each individual find a 
place in the world, and this is not to be identified with a higher level of preference 
satisfaction.  Other satisfactions cannot be traded off against inclusion, or at least not in all 
cases. If we believe this then we believe that the ill of disability is not the ill of a general 
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lack of resources, or the ill of a general lack of preference satisfaction. Rather, in each case, 
it is a loss or suffering of a highly specific kind.26 Our duty, on this view, is to make good 
that particular loss if we can through remedy or nullification or a combination of the two. 
Elizabeth Anderson makes a similar claim: 'forms of remedy should match the type of 
injustice it matches'.27 Usually, I believe,  it is only if we can neither remedy nor nullify to a 
decent degree that we should look towards compensation. But even here compensation 
would be of a highly specific sort. First a cash payment may be justified to defray 
additional expenses and lost opportunities of disability: this would be a remedy of the 
economic loss. It is a further, and uncomfortable, question whether we feel that a payment 
beyond this would be justified, to provide mitigating (rather than full) compensation for 
other dissatisfactions.
I understand here that I may be preaching only to the already converted, and many 
will want to say that it should be up to each individual disabled person to judge what sort 
of redress would be appropriate, or at least to have more discretion than I have allowed. 
But is it really ever the case that a victim of injustice has the right to specify the form of the 
redress? All I can do to press this line of doubt is to point out that there are many examples 
where we do not think that people who suffer injustice have the right to determine how 
that injustice is to be remedied. Consider the following.
As a teenager (I think) I read  a detective story, the name, author and plot of which 
escapes me. But one episode lodged in my mind. An elderly couple have bought a brand 
new Cadillac, of which they are overly proud. One morning, only a short time after they 
take first delivery of the car, they go downstairs to their locked garage, only to find the 
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murdered body of a stranger in the locked car. The police impound the car for forensic 
tests. A few days later the couple write to the police saying that because of the 
unpleasantness surrounding that particular car they cannot face having it back. So they 
would like a new one please. Only this time they would like it in red, with white trim, 
which shouldn't cost any more. The police write back a curt note saying that they can have 
it back, all cleaned up, when the forensic team is finished with it.
But imagine now that in the course of the tests the car was destroyed and so redress 
is due. And imagine too that red with white trim actually costs less than the original black. 
Still it is hard to get oneself in the frame of mind where it seems apparent that the couple 
have a right to name the colour of the replacement car, even if it might be thoughtful for 
the police to ask. Strict restitution is all that is owed, even if something preferred costs no 
more, or even, is cheaper.28
For another example consider the recent change in practice among British domestic 
insurance companies. One insures against losing goods up to a certain valuation. It used to 
be the case that if your claim was agreed you were simply given cash. Now the practice is 
to replace the lost goods with equivalent goods. The reason for this change is pragmatic: to 
reduce the number of fraudulent claims. But the change was introduced with little fuss, 
and, so I believe, little opposition. Yet if one feels that one has a right to receive redress in 
one's preferred form, this should have led to strong protest. The absence of protest is 
presumably due to the widespread belief that one is entitled only to be put back into the 
exact situation one was in before the loss. Remedy or restitution, rather than compensation, 
in other words, is the most appropriate form of redress in these cases, and compensation is 
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to be offered only when restitution is impossible or impractical. Again there is not so much 
an argument here, as support for the view that my position is closer to common beliefs 
about redress than it might have been thought.
The Problem of Inferiority and Humiliation
Elizabeth Anderson suggests that what is wrong with much writing about disability is that
the disabled are presented as making a claim based on their inferiority. However, their 
claim is properly based on their equality.29 It is surely very hard not to be sympathetic to 
this thought, but there is a question of whether there may not be a false contrast at work 
here. Anderson’s phrase seems to pre-suppose the following thought: ‘all we, the disabled, 
ask is to be treated as the equal citizens that we are.’ And fair enough. But how are we to 
do that?  The obvious answer is that we should set up our social structures in such a way 
that they do not discriminate against people with certain resource bundles. Anderson says 
‘the disabled ask that the social disadvantages others impose on them for having the 
disability be removed.’30
Again this is a fully reasonable call. But the problem is that discrimination is very 
rarely deliberate or ‘imposed’. It is a very hard matter to set up social structures in the 
required way, and we often do not know that something has gone wrong until someone 
complains. Consider a striking example from Anita Silvers. When Microsoft introduced 
Windows this jeopardized the employment of many blind and visually impaired people 
who relied on screen readers that worked for DOS but not for Windows. As companies, 
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through normal commercial practices, updated their computer systems many such 
employees were threatened.31
This example is introduced here for several reasons. In the first instance it reminds 
us that the social world is a complex and, above all, un-coordinated, place. No one,
however thoughtful, will have sight of more than a portion of it, and often we have to wait 
to find out the consequences of our actions (or inaction) as we cannot reasonably predict 
everything. Thus we need constant reminders that our existing practices, as well as 
changes, discriminate or disadvantage. We need to know where the shoe pinches. Are 
objections and claims for equal treatment by those who suffer made in the name of equality 
or inferiority? Perhaps the question is idle. But the message is that it can be virtually 
impossible to tell in advance and in detail how our practices are, or will be, discriminatory, 
and we need victims and potential victims to speak up so that the situation can be 
corrected.
Now, Anderson may well claim that this discussion misses her point. We must 
distinguish the necessity of revealing how one is affected by existing social policies, and 
how one would be affected by social policies purporting to rectify the problem. The person 
who brings their plight to the broader conscience may suffer a small humiliation in the 
process, but if the remedy offered was financial compensation for the loss of job we might 
well claim to find ‘disrespect for the visually impaired’ inherent in such a proposal. These 
people do not want to be pitied and compensated; rather they expect to be treated as 
equals in obtaining and maintaining employment. Anderson’s point, then, is better put not 
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in terms of how one is forced to frame one’s claim, but whether attempts to meet that claim 
are disrespectful, or stigmatising, or humiliating, and so on.
But how do we develop non-humiliating social policy? Isn't it humiliating to single 
out people with disabilities for any type of special treatment? Here the idea of nullification 
is especially pertinent. If disability can be nullified - - ie the world comes to be arranged so 
that biological characteristics become an irrelevance in certain respects - - then no one is 
singled out. Nullifying action is social. While carried out for the benefit of individuals it 
does not have to name, single out, or point the finger at any given individual, and it does 
not require declarations by individuals, humiliating or otherwise.32
Clearly many current policies already take this form, but equally clearly we have 
made only small progress to date. How much more can be done on this score is partly a 
matter of how much effort and imagination we put in. Consider, for example, 
developments in the US motel business. Older motels often have no special provision for 
accessibility. More recent motels will tend to have a few rooms specially equipped. 
Presumably any disabled person, in booking a room, can request one of the special rooms. 
But some larger chains have now gone the next step: all rooms are accessible. So no one 
need mention that they are a wheelchair user when booking a room, for there is no fear of 
getting the wrong sort of room. In this very limited way, and very limited but significant 
arena, one form of disability is nullified.33
Of course it would be even better - - both from the point of view of nullification and 
economic efficiency - - if having a disability was never seen as shaming or embarrassing, 
and so asking for an accessible room was psychologically as easy as asking for a room on 
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the no-smoking floor, or with an ocean view. Perhaps this is already the case for many 
people already, but it is far from universally so. In present circumstances this is not a 
change we can make quickly.
But to repeat. It is very important to note that whatever forms of nullification we 
attempt, it is very different in its workings from both remedy and compensation. 
Nullification acts on structures and institutions, rather than on the people who are to 
benefit, and so it often avoids any sort of identification of individuals, or humiliating 
applications for assistance. This is the important reason, then, that I still owe to explain 
why even when complete remedy is possible, it may nevertheless not be the ideal form of 
redress.
Disability Policy and Redistribution
Even though I have argued against much of Dworkin’s approach, he nevertheless helps us 
to face up to a question which must be faced eventually but is more often ducked. How 
much of national income should we spend on provision for those with disabilities? One 
view might be that we take a utilitarian approach and simply spend money where it would 
do most good. This might mean spending a lot on provision for people with disabilities, 
but more likely it would not. Providing for people with disabilities can be very expensive 
and may not always do a great deal for their well-being compared to other possible uses 
for the same resources. Or we might take an egalitarian perspective. If we assume that at 
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least some disabled people are among the worst off in society then enormous tax, and 
public spending, would be necessary to try to bring about equality.
Dworkin’s insurance scheme, suitably modified, provides another perspective. 
Suppose we set up a hypothetical insurance, but instead of the insurance payout being 
made directly to people with disabilities it is paid over to a government agency, and, of 
course, people make their (hypothetical) insurance decisions in the knowledge that this is 
how the money is to be spent. In other words we set a tax rate to provide for people with 
disabilities at a level which would be determined by everyone's hypothetical insurance 
decisions. This tax is paid over to the government agency  which  allocates its budget in the 
following way: the most important goal is to try to provide people with disabilities with 
the means to re-establish a place in the world. This requires medical care, but also social, 
political, cultural and material innovation: thus both remedy and nullification. It may also 
require subsidies for some forms of activity, and in some cases compensating payments to 
improve well-being when nothing else can reasonably be done. 
This account raises many questions. The first, quite obvious, problem is the 
vagueness of the goal of establishing a worthwhile place in the world for people with 
disabilities. There are two immediate difficulties. First how do we specify the goal for any 
given individual: what is it to establish a place in the world? Second, even if the goal is 
fully specified for each individual, what should the collective goal of social policy be? I’ll 
attempt to say something about the former problem before addressing the latter.
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Much as I would like to be able to give a reasoned and plausible general account of 
what it is to have a place in the world, I am unable to do this is a satisfying way. But some 
observations are nevertheless worthwhile:
a) At the heart of the account will be the idea (unanalyzed here) of inclusion. This, we have 
seen, is the reason why compensation is unlikely to be the central form of redress for 
people with disabilities.34
b) Any full account must make room for the insights of the various models of disability 
mentioned here, especially with relation to their account of what specifically is so disabling 
about disability. To this extent we can come to a rough understanding of what it is to have 
a place in the world through a disjunction of negatives: it is not to be excluded from the 
workplace; not to fail to enjoy a reasonable share of economic goods; not to feel 
stigmatized by other people’s use of language, and so on. Ideally we would hope for 
further unifying insight, and some attempts could be offered, but I do not know of 
anything that would generate the richness of the idea we seek.
c) The idea of having a worthwhile place in the world is partly a threshold notion, in the 
sense that once achieved either you cannot have more or, alternatively, that having more is 
much less significant than reaching the threshold.35 But it is also partly a matter of degree 
in that it is possible to move people below the threshold closer to it in numerous ways.
I do not pretend that this is enough, but it is all I can say here. But suppose we did 
have the account, what next? The most obvious idea would be that our first task must be to 
bring everyone to the threshold. Those above it should be taxed (but not to an extent which 
would bring them below the threshold) so that those below can be provided with the 
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multifarious forms of assistance -- including alterations to the social world - - that will 
eventually bring everyone over the threshold.
But is this correct? One difficulty is that it may just not be possible to bring everyone 
to the threshold. Second, even if it is, I have proposed that the resources to be devoted to 
such policies are to be determined not by the goal of bringing everyone to the threshold, 
but by the hypothetical insurance decisions people would make. This may turn out to 
converge on the same outcome but we cannot assume in advance that it will. To put this 
schematically, imagine that we gloss the idea of establishing a place in the world as that of 
achieving one’s necessities. But beyond the realm of necessity is the realm of luxury. In our 
insurance decisions we may be prepared to give up quite a lot of luxury in order to reduce 
the chances of falling below the level of necessity. But are we prepared to give up all 
luxury for the sake of ensuring that we do not ever fall below the level of necessity? 
Perhaps if the threshold of necessity is set at a high enough level then we would. But then 
the chances of achieving it for all (and thus ensuring that no one falls below it) would be 
reduced. So there is clearly room for further discussion here.36
To see the same issue from another point of view, imagine that you personally are a 
member of a small group who are  the furthest away from having established a place in the 
world. In this sense then, no one has a bigger or stronger complaint than you. And suppose 
it is possible that every member in your group could be brought up to the threshold. 
However this would be only at great expense, not only in monetary terms but in terms of 
other values. Suppose, for example, making the environment fully inclusive requires, in 
addition to huge amounts of money, the demolition of some historic buildings, prehistoric 
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earthworks, and tracts of ancient forests. You, personally, as the individual with the 
greatest complaint, may think it is too much to ask, even if carrying out this project will not 
make anyone else (including future generations) anything like as badly off as you are now. 
So this might be another occasion where the right thing to do is compromise with 
compensation.
This may seem even more likely to be the case if a given individual cannot possibly 
be brought to the threshold. Imagine that how much we spend, and how much we try, all 
we can do is bring a person from a very low level of inclusion to a low level. Here we 
might think that there are clear limits to what we should do, even if we have only financial 
expense to weigh in the balance. Again the two tests - - rational insurance decisions, and 
what would seem a reasonable demand from the standpoint of the person with the greatest 
complaint - - seem to converge on the answer that some compensation should be offered, 
but nothing like as much as we might spend in the attempt to eradicate the complaint. 
Proposals must be seen in the context of their general consequences.
Does this mean that some people, or groups, will be permanently excluded? Not 
necessarily. Just as, in real life, one may adjust the level of insurance one takes out in the 
light of what current technology allows one to do with the payout, the same applies on a 
social scale. If there is a breakthrough in enabling technology, or medical care, then just as 
it would be rational for an individual to take out a greater level of insurance cover, it 
would be justified to increase taxes so people with disabilities can take advantage of the 
new opportunities. And if we seem to be on the verge of a social breakthrough higher taxes 
would be justified to pursue this.
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Furthermore, although we might not feel justified in demolishing an old building 
simply because it is not accessible, it does not follow that when the time comes for renewal 
we can be justified in renewing it in a non-accessible way. So there is hope that general 
process of material renewal will allow us to include increasing numbers of people in new 
ways. 
On this view, the disablement agency will be charged with the duty of spending the 
pseudo insurance payments in the most effective way possible; a combination of medical 
care (remedy) educational, social and material policies (nullification) and in some cases 
compensation. A variety of difficult and subtle decisions will have to be made, and regular 
involvement of people with a variety of disabilities would be indispensable. Of course 
various difficulties are bound to arise, but the framework I suggest should encourage an 
interesting reversal of some familiar considerations about public spending and efficiency. 
Standard anti-bureaucratic arguments suppose - - often quite correctly - - that 
bureaucracies and government agencies silt up under their own processes, and constantly 
lose the fight against efficiency. Thus they eat up more and more resources to keep 
performing the same functions. However the argument here is that the disablement agency 
can justifiably put out a greater call for funds only if it can use those funds in an 
increasingly effective way; that is, it is entitled to ask for more money only if it can bring 
more people up to the threshold. In effect it can charge more only if it offers a 
proportionally better insurance payout. The agency’s funding, then, will depend on what it 
can do, and will vary depending on the state of its own programmes and potential 
technological and social breakthrough.
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In summary, I have said that the goal of social policy should be to enable disabled 
people to find a worthwhile place in the world. Their opportunities in this respect will be 
determined by the resources at their disposal (internal and external) in combination with 
the social structures within which they are placed. Three approaches to the elimination of 
disadvantage have been discussed: remedy, which attempts to restore ‘missing’ internal 
resources; compensation, which substitutes external resources to make up for the loss; and 
nullification, which alters social structures. Given our goal, compensation is generally the 
least suitable option, and normally is appropriate only when the other forms fail. In the 
light of considerations of respect for individuals, among other reasons, nullification may 
often be the preferred option, if available. I have also suggested a way for determining 
how much of national income should be spent on providing for people with disabilities. 
But as always, there is more left to be said than has been said.37
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